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The Development of Social Regulation in the European Community: 
Policy Externalities, Transaction Costs. Motivational Factors
Giandomenico Majone 
European University Institute
The apparently unstoppable growth of EC social regulation poses a difficult 
problem of explanation to the student of European integration. Some 
supranational regulation in the areas of competition, mergers, state 
subsidies, and the free movement of the factors of production is necessary 
for the proper functioning of the single European market, but the same 
cannot be said of social regulation. In fact, of the three most important 
fields of social regulation — environment, consumer protection, and health, 
and safety at the workplace -- only the latter is explicitly mentioned in the 
Treaty of Rome, and then only as an area where the Commission should 
promote close coordination among the member states. Despite the lack of 
a clear legal basis, however, three Environmental Action Programmes were 
proposed by the Commission and approved by the Council of Ministers 
before the Single European Act formally recognized the competence of the 
Community in this area.
True, the first social regulatory measures were directly related to the 
free movement of goods: the harmonization of different health and safety 
standards of internationally traded products was meant to prevent the
A  first draft o f this paper has been presented at the conference on "European 
Integration Between Nation and Federation", Hochschule St.Gallen, September 1-3, 1994. 




























































































formation of non-tariff barriers. But quite soon the emphasis of EC social 
regulation shifted from product standards to process standards, and thus to 
positive regulatory objectives rather than the mere prevention of trade 
barriers.
Moreover, regulatory measures became increasingly ambitious, to the 
point that some recent directives exceed the standards of the most regulated 
member states. Now, according to intergovemmentalist theories, the quality 
of policy decisions in the EC is determined by the preferences of the least 
forthcoming government. Hence, barring special circumstances, regulatory 
outcomes should converge toward a least-common-denominator solution. 
From an intergovemmentalist perspective, policy innovation in the EC is 
a practical and theoretical impossibility.
Not even neo-functionalists, for all their interest in the leadership role 
of supranational institutions, thought it necessary to offer a theory of policy 
innovation at the European level. For them, the initial decision of 
governments to delegate policy-making powers, in a given sector, to a 
supranational institution inevitably creates pressures to expand the authority 
of that institution into neighbouring policy areas. But even neo­
functionalists now admit that this prediction has been falsified. For 
example, although the Rome Treaty has a whole section on social policy, 
this field remains, and probably will continue to remain, under the control 
of the member states (it should be noted that even the Annex on social 
policy of the Maastricht Treaty is an intergovernmental agreement among 
the member states, with the exception of the United Kingdom).
In fact, in terms of traditional (i.e., redistributive) social policy, the 



























































































protection, health and safety regulation, or equal rights for working men 
and women, however, European legislation has often gone beyond the level 
of protection provided by the majority of member states to their citizens. 
To what extent these regulatory measures are justified on efficiency 
grounds is an important issue, but not one with which this paper is 
immediately concerned. What the paper tries to explain is the willingness 
of the national governments to delegate such extensive regulatory powers 
outside the economic sphere, as well as the dynamics of the post-delegation 
phase.
Public-choice theorists have advanced persuasive explanations of the 
secular trend toward centralization that can be observed in many mature 
federal systems. Some of the causal factors identified by these scholars are 
clearly at work also in the European Community/European Union (EC/EU); 
for example, the interest of the European institutions in expanding the 
scope of their competences. Yet, caution is needed before one can 
extrapolate the results obtained for polities which already possess powerful 
federal institutions. In the European system, an intergovernmental body, the 
Council of Ministers, remains the ultimate legislator; hence the question 
about the willingness of the member states to delegate should be given an 
answer which takes the specific features of the EC system into account. 
Among these features is the fact that centralization has occurred in some 
fields, especially economic and social regulation, but not in others.
The explanation of such "selective centralization" suggested in this 
paper goes beyond the analysis of interests and rent-seeking behaviour, to 




























































































intergovernmental agreement or a EC directive) among self-interested 
actors with incomplete and asymmetric information. In this approach, 
derived from the work of authors like Coase, Oliver Williamson, and 
Milgrom and Roberts, the most interesting issues concern those 
motivational factors, such as mistrust and imperfect commitments, which 
increase the costs of transacting and prevent a satisfactory alignment of the 
interests of the various contractual partners. This analysis complements that 
of public-choice theorists, with the added advantage of providing a 
coherent intellectual basis for normative proposals.
1. Policy externalities and the dilemma of regulatory federalism 
The increasing complexity of technology and society and the growing 
interdependence of national economies create a variety of unwanted side 
effects which economists have attempted to classify on a lengthening list 
of externalities. A negative externality exists when the action of one 
individual, one firm, or one government impose uncompensated costs on 
other individuals, firms, or governments. International externalities can be 
transmitted through natural environmental media, as in the case of 
transboundary air or water pollution, but also through trade. Thus, 
hazardous substances may cross national boundaries as ingredients or 
additives in a large number of internationally traded articles such as 
agricultural products, pesticides, pharmaceuticals, or fabrics that have been 
treated with carcinogenic substances.
When the trade flows from a producer in a heavily regulated country 




























































































substances, the level of risk imposed on the citizens of the importing 
countries is largely determined by the regulatory policy of the exporting 
country. As this example shows, many international externalities (positive 
as well as negative) are created by the actions of national regulators, and 
it is with such "policy externalities" that this paper is concerned.
Notice that internationally relevant policy externalities can arise even 
in the case of purely local market failures. For instance, problems of safety 
regulation for construction of local buildings create no transboundary 
externalities and thus, according to the principle of subsidiarity, should be 
left to the local authorities. However, if safety regulations specify a 
particular material only produced in that locality, they amount to a trade 
barrier and thus have negative external effects. Hence, local regulation of 
a local market failure may create an international policy externality. 
Similarly, local authorities have sometimes controlled air pollution by 
requiring extremely tall smokestacks on industrial facilities. With tall 
stacks, by the time the emissions descend to ground level they are usually 
in the next city, region, or country, and so of no concern to the jurisdiction 
where they were emitted.
The strategic use of domestic regulation to gain advantages with 
respect to other countries or jurisdictions is a pervasive phenomenon. 
Because of the policy externalities it creates, every multi-level system of 
government faces a serious dilemma. Local governments may be more 
attuned to individual tastes, but they are unlikely to make a clear separation 
between providing public goods for their citizens and engaging in policies 




























































































Centralization of regulatory authority at a higher level of government can 
correct such policy externalities, and perhaps capture economies of scale 
in policy making. But its cost is the homogenization of policy across 
jurisdictions that may be dissimilar with respect to underlying tastes or 
needs.
There is no easy way of escaping this dilemma of regulatory 
federalism. Subsidiarity and mutual recognition — to mention two 
principles often suggested as possible solutions in the context of the EC/EU 
— address only one hom of the dilemma and do not face the issue of 
negative policy externalities. It would be equally plausible to argue that, 
because the integrated European market is such a new and still incomplete 
creation, the threat posed by the strategic use of regulation by national 
authorities is more serious than the danger of excessive and inefficient 
uniformity. As we shall see below, this argument is supported by a good 
deal of empirical evidence; but it would be wrong to jump to the 
conclusion that centralization is, if not an optimal at least a second-best 
solution. Under present institutional arrangements neither further 
centralization nor decentralization (in the sense of a re-nationalization of 
regulatory policy making) are acceptable alternatives. In the concluding 
section of this paper I suggest institutional reforms, both at the national and 
the European level, capable of mitigating, even if not resolving, the 
dilemma of regulatory federalism. Before making normative 
recommendations, however, several methodological and substantive issues 





























































































2. From negative externalities to transaction costs 
We know from Coase theorem (Coase, 1960) that it is not externalities as 
such that constitute a problem for collective action, but positive transaction 
costs and imperfect information. In a situation where transaction costs are 
zero and information is complete, affected parties can always bargain 
among themselves to reach an efficient solution: either the externality is 
"internalized" by the emitter or, if the costs of eliminating it are greater 
than the benefits, the externality persists but is shown, ipso facto, to be a 
Pareto-irrelevant one.
The same argument, together with the usual assumptions of self- 
interested behaviour and bounded rationality, can be applied to problems 
of collective choice at the international level. Absent transaction costs and 
given perfect information, there would be no need for sovereign states to 
delegate regulatory powers to supranational or international bodies, or to 
harmonize their legislations. If national regulators were willing and able to 
take into account the external effects of their decisions; if they were well- 
informed about one another’s intentions; and if the costs of organizing and 
implementing policy coordination were negligible, international 
externalities and other market failures could be managed by a series of 
bilateral agreements, or even by means of non-cooperative mechanisms 
such as retaliation or tit-for-tat strategies (Majone, 1994a).
Of course, such conditions are never satisfied in practice and most 
international agreements are accompanied by the creation of a secretariat 
to facilitate the exchange of information and reduce the costs of organizing 



























































































greater than this, however. In order to explain why member states have 
accepted such far reaching limitations of their sovereignty we must 
examine more closely the different kinds of transaction costs that arise in 
the formulation and implementation of international regulatory 
agreements.
In Coase’s definition, transaction costs are incurred in order "to 
discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one 
wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a 
bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to 
make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on" 
(Coase, 1960, p.15). For our purposes it is necessary to adapt somewhat 
this definition and, at the same time, to take it a little further. A natural 
classification of transaction costs consistent with Coase’s notion can be 
obtained from the different stages of the policy-making process: problem 
definition, agenda setting, policy formulation, implementation, evaluation.
Different transaction costs arise at the different stages since neither 
the nature of the task nor the set of policy actors remain constant 
throughout the process. Thus, under the power of legislative initiative 
granted to it by the Treaty of Rome, the European Commission is (in 
theory) the key actor at the early stages of policy making, while actual 
implementation of Community rules is largely under the control of national 
administrations. Simplifying, we can however group all transaction costs 
under three broad categories: search and information costs, bargaining and 
decision costs, policing, enforcement and measurement costs. As explained 





























































































willingness of the member states to delegate extensive regulatory powers 
to European institutions.
Particularly in the area of social regulation (environment, consumer 
protection, health and safety, equal rights for male and female workers) this 
delegation has gone well beyond the functional needs of a single European 
market. The trend toward centralized policy making is strikingly illustrated 
by the development of environmental regulation. In the two decades from 
1967 to 1987, when the Single European Act acknowledged the 
competence of the Community to legislate in this area, well over 100 
directives, regulations and decisions were introduced by the Commission 
and approved by the Council. Today, European environmental regulation 
includes more than 200 pieces of legislation. In many member states the 
corpus of environmental law of Community origin outweighs that of purely 
domestic origin (House of Lords, 1992). Moreover, while the first 
environmental directives were for the most part concerned with product 
regulation, and hence could be justified by the need to prevent that national 
standards would create non-tariff barriers to the free movement of goods, 
later directives increasingly stressed process regulation (emission and 
ambient quality standards, regulation of waste disposal and of land use, 
protection of flora and fauna, environmental impact assessments, and so 
on), aiming at environmental rather than free-trade objectives.
Such developments appear all the more surprising when one recalls 
that before the Treaty on European Union all environmental directives 
required unanimous approval by the Council of Ministers. Popular concern 



























































































governments could have responded in a variety of ways to domestic 
demands for more environmental protection. In particular, environmental 
objectives could have been promoted through intergovernmental agreements 
as was done, for example, in case of the Agreement on social policy 
concluded between the member states, with the exception of the United 
Kingdom, and annexed to the Maastricht Treaty (Vogel-Polsky, 1994).
Coase theorem suggests that transaction costs may be one reason why 
member states chose instead to transfer regulatory powers to the 
supranational level. In fact, the
(including policy coordination which, in the context of European 
institutions, means joint and interdependent actions without legal forces
renegers cannot be taken to the European Court of Justice) is that it is 
often very difficult for the parties concerned to know whether or not an 
agreement is properly kept. Policing, enforcement and measurement costs 
are particularly significant in the case of environmental and other social 
regulatory measures. This is because of the difficulty of monitoring 
pollution, but also because of problems related to regulatory discretion and 
imperfect commitments. For example, measurement problems have played 
an important part in the conflict which opposed the United Kingdom to the 
other member states concerning the implementation of the 1976 Directive 
on pollution by dangerous substances. While most member states were 
willing to set uniform, Community-wide discharge standards, the 
implementation of which is fairly easy to monitor, the UK preferred to set 
environmental quality standards. Such standards are more sensitive to the 



























































































much harder for outsiders to monitor. Hence the suspicion of the other 
member states that the U.K.’s preference for environmental quality 
standards was in fact due to an underlying unwillingness to implement its 
share of the agreement (Gatsios and Seabright, 1989).
Monitoring problems are compounded by regulatory discretion. 
Because regulators lack information that only regulated firms have and 
because governments are reluctant, for political reasons, to impose 
excessive costs on industry, bargaining is an essential feature of the process 
of regulatory enforcement. Regardless of what the law says, the process of 
regulation is not simply one where the regulators command and the 
regulated obey. A "market" is created in which bureaucrats and those 
subject to regulation bargain over the precise obligations of the latter 
(Peacock, 1984). Since bargaining is so pervasive, it may be difficult for 
an outside observer to determine whether the spirit, or only the letter, of 
an international regulation has been violated.
When it is difficult to observe whether national governments are 
making an honest effort to enforce a cooperative agreement, the agreement 
is not credible. Sometimes member states have problems of credibility not 
in the eyes of each other but also in the eyes of third parties, such as 
regulated firms or governments outside the Union. For example, where 
pollution has international effects and fines impose significant competitive 
disadvantages on firms that compete internationally, firms are likely to 
believe that national regulators will be unwilling to prosecute them as 
rigorously if they determine the level of enforcement unilaterally rather 




























































































powers to a supranational authority like the European Commission, by 
making more stringent regulation credible, may improve the behaviour of 
regulated firms. Because the Commission is involved in the regulation of 
a large number of firms throughout the Union, it has more to gain by being 
tough in any individual case than a national regulator; weak enforcement 
would destroy its credibility in the eyes of more firms (Gatsios and 
Seabright, 1989, pp.49-50).
3. The costs of mistrust
The costs of organizing, implementing and monitoring collective decisions 
are greatly increased if the parties to the agreement do not trust each other. 
In this section I argue that the mistrust of the member states toward each 
other and toward the European institutions, especially the Commission, has 
led to more centralization than is required by efficiency considerations, and 
risks undoing whatever advantages supranational regulatory delegation may 
possess.
The crucial importance of trust between public administrations is 
demonstrated by the failure of early attempts to harmonize national 
regulations for the approval of new medical drugs. The old EC procedure 
included a set of harmonized criteria for testing new products, and the 
mutual recognition of toxicological and clinical trials, provided they were 
conducted according to EC rules. In order to speed up the process of 
mutual recognition, a "multi-state drug application procedure" (MSAP) was 
introduced in 1975. Under the MSAP, a company that had received a 




























































































could ask for mutual recognition of that approval by at least five other 
countries. The agencies of the countries nominated by the company had 
to approve or raise objections within 120 days. In case of objections, the 
Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP) — a group which 
includes experts from member states and Commission representatives — 
had to be notified. The CPMP would express its opinion within 60 days, 
and could be overruled by the national agency that had raised objections.
The procedure did not work well. Actual decision times were much 
longer than those prescribed by the 1975 Directive, and national regulators 
did not appear to be bound either by decisions of other regulatory bodies, 
or by the opinions of the CPMP. Because of these disappointing results, 
the procedure was revised in 1983. Now only two countries had to be 
nominated in order to be able to apply for a multi-state approval. But even 
the new procedure did not succeed in streamlining the approval process 
since national regulators continued to raise objections against each other 
almost routinely (Kaufer, 1990). These difficulties finally induced the 
Commission, with the support of the European pharmaceutical industry, to 
propose the establishment of a European Agency for the Evaluation of 
Medicinal Products and the creation of a new centralized Community 
procedure, compulsory for biotechnology products and certain types of 
veterinary medicines, and available on an optional basis for other products, 
leading to a Community authorization. Both the agency and the centralized 






























































































In a recent paper on the political economy of centralization professor 
Vaubel examines several variables which may explain why most federal 
states have experienced a secular trend toward centralization. He shows that 
many influential political actors are interested in bringing about a more 
centralized system of government than is warranted on efficiency grounds: 
federal legislators, political executives and bureaucrats; federal judges; 
pressure groups representing regionally homonegeous interests; even 
politicians and bureaucrats at the lower levels of government, since 
expansion of the central government need not be at the expense of the 
lower-level governments (Vaubel, 1992). The example just given and many 
others that could be chosen from recent EC history, but also, say, from the 
experience of the American Confederation in the period 1781-1789, show 
that lack of trust and of "federal comity" (Bundestreue) among the member 
states should also be included in any satisfactory explanation of the trend 
toward greater centralization.
Member states not only mistrust each other; they also mistrust 
European institutions. This attitude has significant, if paradoxical, 
consequences both for the quantitative growth of Community regulations 
and for the poor level of their enforcement. One immediate consequence 
is that the Commission is kept on a very tight rein: it is chronically 
understaffed; closely monitored through an intricate system of "regulatory" 
and "management" committees which can block its proposals and transmit 
the file to the Council, which can overrule the Commission; and obliged 
to rely almost exclusively on the national bureaucracies for the 




























































































Such drastic methods of control are only partially successful in 
limiting the regulatory discretion of the Commission (Majone, 1995) but 
produce several undesirable, and probably unanticipated, results. Consider 
first the budget constraint.
By national standards, the Community budget is quite small: less than 
1.3 per cent of the gross domestic product of the Union or about 4 per cent 
of the combined expenditures of the central governments of the member 
states. It is also very rigid, since compulsory expenditures represent almost 
70 per cent of the budget. These limited resources are insufficient to 
support large-scale initiatives in areas such as industrial policy, energy,
transport or research and development, not to mention social policy or 
■ macroeconomic stabilization (Majone, 1993). However, the budget 
constraint has only a limited impact on regulatory activities, since the real 
costs of regulation are borne by the organizations and individuals who have 
to comply with it. Compared to these costs, the resources needed to
produce the rules are negligible.
The structural difference between regulatory policies and policies 
involving the direct expenditure of public funds is especially important for 
ie analysis of EC policy making since not only the financial, but also the 
political and administrative costs of implementing European rules are borne 
J)y the national administrations rather than the Commission. Thus, the 
attempt to restrict the scope of supranational policies by imposing a tight 
budget constraint has unwittingly favoured the expansion of a mode of 




























































































constraint, regulation turned out to be the most effective way for the 
Commission to maximize its influence.
Moreover, by denying the Commission any significant role in 
implementation the member states have encouraged a tendency to focus on 
the quantitative growth of European legislation (so that, for example, the 
number of directives approved by the Council is viewed as an important 
indicator of success) rather than on effective compliance and actual results. 
Over-regulation cannot be blamed only on the Commission, however. 
Many regulations and directives are introduced at the demand of individual 
member states, the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and 
Social Committee and a variety of private and public-interest groups, rather 
than by autonomous initiative of the Commission. While responsiveness to 
such demands may increase the legitimacy of the Commission, it also 
contributes to the apparently unstoppable growth of EC regulation.
Also the phenomenon of regulatory complexity may be usefully 
analyzed from the perspective suggested here. Many students of EC policy 
making have noted that Community directives usually contain many more 
technical details than comparable national legislation. The explanation that 
such regulatory complexity is due to the technical perfectionism of the 
Commission lacks plausibility: the Commission, as noted above, is 
chronically understaffed, has no in-house research capabilities, and is 
largely composed of generalists, not of technical experts.
'Rather, regulatory complexity is in part another manifestation of the 
cascading effect of mutual distrust. Doubting the commitment of other 



























































































unfamiliar with different styles of administration, national representatives 
often insist on spelling out mutual obligations in the greatest possible 
detail. On the other hand, a vague and open-ended directive not only gives 
a member state wide latitude for wrongful or self-interested application, but 
also prevents the possibility of invoking it by an individual before a 
national court (Weiler, 1988). Thus, regulatory complexity may also serve 
the objectives of the Commission by providing partial compensation for its 
exclusion from the implementation process. |
Also the labyrinthine system of committees of national experts, 
created to assist the Commission and at the same time to limit its 
discretion, favours regulatory complexity by introducing a strong technical 
bias into the Community regulatory process. In many cases, national 
experts have significantly increased the quality of Commission proposals 
(Weiler, 1988; Dehousse et al., 1992; Winter, 1993). In fact, what is known 
about the modus operandi of these committees suggests that debates there 
follow substantive rather than national lines. A good deal of copinage 
technocratique develops between Commission officials and national experts 
interested in problem solving rather than in defending national positions 
(Eichener, 1992). By the time a Commission proposal reaches the Council 
of Ministers all the technical details will have been worked out — but little 
or no attention will have been paid to issues of cost-effectiveness or 
practical implementability. This technical bias, combined with the 
reluctance of the Council to engage in difficult and time-consuming policy 
control, and with the lack of central oversight at the Commission level, 





























































































Empirical evidence on this point is scanty at best, but the hypothesis 
has some theoretical support. Some economists have argued that an 
explanation of regulatory complexity does not need to rest on the peculiar 
interests of the regulators but on the economic interests of third parties, 
namely, specialists in various aspects of regulation such as lawyers, 
accountants, engineers or safety experts^ Unlike other interest groups, these 
experts care more about the process than the outcome of regulation. They 
have an interest in regulatory complexity because complexity increases the 
value of their expertise. Thus "red tape" may not be simply evidence of 
bureaucratic inefficiency or ineptness. Rather, in part, rule complexity is 
a private interest that arises because a complex regulatory environment 
allows for specialization in various stages of rule making, as well as in 
"rule intermediation" (Kearl, 1983; Quandt, 1983).
I
V,
4. Digression on contractual incompleteness and EC directives 
To appreciate the significance of the motivational factors discussed in the 
preceding section it is important to keep in mind the open-ended character 
of most Community acts, and of the founding treaties themselves. The most 
frequently used instrument of social regulation, the directive, is binding 
only "as to the results to be achieved" (Articles 189 of the EEC Treaty and 
161 of the Euratom Treaty) but leaves "the choice of form and methods" 
to the national authorities. In other words, the directive lays down an 
objective and leaves it to the member states to achieve that objective 




























































































In a series of important cases (in particular the Van Duvn case in 
1974) the European Court of Justice has attempted to reduce the 
uncertainty and increase the effectiveness of EC legislation by limiting the 
discretion of national governments in implementing Community directives. 
However, these attempts not only provoked negative reactions at the 
national level, but also tended to distort the structure of the founding 
treaties by blurring the distinction between directives and "regulations" -- 
acts which are directly applicable in all member states. At any rate, even 
after acknowledging, in theory, the principle of direct effect first stated by 
the Court in the Van Duvn case, the member states remained reluctant to 
accept interference with national administrative arrangements for 
implementation.
One of the sources of uncertainty, hence of transaction costs, 
associated with implementation of Community directives is the differing 
structural character of the legislation that has been agreed. As Macrory 
(1992, pp.348-349) writes, "[s]ome directives prescribe explicit and precise 
goals that must be achieved in a given sector which in theory should be 
reasonably straightforward to monitor and enforce. Another class contains 
similarly precise goals within specified actors or areas but leaves a large 
element of discretion to Member States in determining where they are to 
apply". Moreover, what is actually implied by the concept of 
"implementation" is by no means cut and dried (ib., p.352).
The open-ended character of directives suggests that these 
Community acts (and perhaps also other instruments of the "soft law" 



























































































European executive and the member states. The theory of incomplete 
contracting occupies a central position in the new economics of 
organization and in the positive theory of institutions (Williamson, 1985; 
Eggertsson, 1990; Kreps, 1990; North, 1990; and Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992, on which the following summary is largely based).
Keeping in mind that in the language of the new institutionalism a 
contract is any agreement (not necessarily legally binding) among actors 
who recognize their mutual interests and agree to modify their behaviour 
in ways that are mutually beneficial, it is easy to see that a complete 
contract could solve the motivation problem of collective action. 
Motivation questions arise because contractual partners have their own 
private interests, which are rarely aligned with the interests of other 
partners or of the organization to which the partners belong. Because of 
this misalignment, contractual partners do not act as they are supposed to 
act in order to carry out the contract. Now, a complete contract would 
specify precisely what each partner is supposed to do in every possible 
circumstance, and arrange the distribution of the benefits and costs realized 
in each contingency so that each partner individually finds it convenient to 
abide by the contract’s terms. Thus, the motivation problem would be 
solved.
However, complete contracting requires, inter alia, that the partners 
be able to foresee and accurately describe all the relevant contingencies 
that might arise in the course of the contract, and that they be willing and 
able to agree upon an efficient course of action for each possible 




























































































contract’s terms are being met and, if they are violated, to enforce the 
agreement. Such requirements are never satisfied in actual contracting 
because of a combination of factors: bounded rationality, opportunistic 
behaviour (including the possibility of reneging) and imperfect 
commitments.
One possible contractual response to these constraints is to write 
inflexible contracts with blanket provisions that are to apply very broadly. 
The practice of Community institutions of enacting directives with 
provisions every bit as detailed and precise as those found in a regulation 
(Hartley, 1988, p.206) may be interpreted as such a response. However, as 
noted above, to blur the distinction between directives and regulations is 
to distort the structure of the founding treaties. More generally, an 
inflexible specification of the actions to be taken is likely to be too 
unresponsive to changing conditions. Hence inflexible agreements are an 
efficient method of contractual governance only for relatively simple, once- 
for-all transactions such as the so-called spot-market contracts.
A more promising response to contractual incompleteness is relational 
contracting, which does not attempt the impossible task of complete 
contracting but instead settles for an agreement that frames the entire 
relationship. This mode of contractual governance recognizes that it is 
impossible to concentrate all of the relevant bargaining action at the ex 
ante contracting stage. The same point was made in section 2 above, where 
it was argued that bargaining is not limited to the initial stages of 





























































































formulation), but is also an essential feature of the process of regulatory 
enforcement.
Under relational contracting the parties "do not agree on detailed 
plans of action but on goals and objectives, on general provisions that are 
broadly applicable, on the criteria to be used in deciding what to do when 
unforeseen circumstances arise, and on who has what power to act and the 
bounds limiting the range of actions that can be taken, and on dispute 
resolution mechanisms to be used if disagreements occur" (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992, p.131). It may be argued, though the point will not be 
further developed here, that the original concept of the European directive, 
as it appears in the founding treaties, is quite close to the philosophy of 
relational contracting, while attempts to erase the difference between 
directives and regulations represent a misguided response to the problems 
of contractual incompleteness. Be that as it may, it is suggested that 
students of EC policy making can learn a great deal from recent theories 
on the governance of contractual relations.
5. The European Commission as policy entrepreneur 
The argument developed so far may be summarized by saying that, in order 
to explain the assignment to the supranational level of greater regulatory 
powers than would be required by efficiency considerations, one must 
consider also the motivation issue — the imperfect alignment of national 
interests with the interests of the Union, and the transaction costs this 
entails. The delegation of extensive powers of adjudication and policy 






























































































more traditional international organizations. To understand the quantitative 
and qualitative growth of European social regulation, however, it is equally 
important to analyze the post-delegation phase.
The thrust of much recent research on political-bureaucratic relations 
is that bureaucracy has a substantial degree of autonomy, and that direct 
political control is rather weak (Wilson, 1980; Moe, 1987, 1990; Majone, 
1994c). Oversight for purposes of serious policy control is time- 
consuming, costly, and difficult to do well under conditions of uncertainty 
and complexity. At any rate, legislators are concerned more with satisfying 
voters to increase the probability of re-election than with overseeing the 
bureaucracy. As a result, they do not typically invest their scarce resources 
in general policy control. Instead, they prefer to intervene quickly, 
inexpensively and in ad hoc ways to protect particular clients in particular 
matters (Mayhew, 1974). Hence legislative oversight is un-coordinated and 
fragmented. Similarly, the literature on the budgetary process has cast 
doubts on the budget as an effective tool of control. As Wildavsky (1964) 
discovered, budgeting is decentralized and incremental, resulting in 
automatic increases that further insulate the bureaucracy from political 
control.
Theories based on the principal-agent model give a more positive 
assessment of the possibility of political control of the bureaucracy. 
According to agency theory, political control is possible because elected 
politicians can design administrative institutions with incentive structures 
to facilitate control (Wood and Waterman, 1991, p.803). It is certainly true 





























































































their agents and impose an incentive structure on their behaviour. Over
time, however, bureaucrats accumulate job-specific expertise, and this
"asset specificity" (Williamson, 1985) alters the original relationship. Now
politicians must deal with agents they once selected, and in these dealings
the bureaucrats have an advantage in technical and operational expertise.
As a result, they are increasingly able to pursue their objective of greater
autonomy. As Terry Moe (1990, p.143) writes:
Once an agency is created, the political world 
becomes a different place. Agency bureaucrats are 
now political actors in their own right: they have 
career and institutional interests that may not be 
entirely congruent with their formal missions, and 
they have powerful resources — expertise and 
delegated authority — that might be employed 
toward these "selfish" ends. They are now players 
whose interests and resources alter the political 
game.
This recent research on political-bureaucratic relations throws 
considerable light on the dynamics of delegation and control in the EC 
context. Also for the representatives of the member states in the Council 
of Ministers oversight for purposes of serious policy control is costly, time- 
consuming, and difficult to do well. Hence their unwillingness to invest 
scarce resources in such activities. As was mentioned in Section 3, the 
"comitology" system is an attempt to control the Commission’s discretion 
in the execution of Council directives. Regulatory and management 
committees created under this system can block a Commission measure and 
transmit the case to the Council, which can overrule the Commission. Even 



























































































the chair, but has a strong presumption in its favour (Ludlow, 1991, p.107). 
According to the most detailed empirical study of the comitology system 
to-date "Commission officials generally do not think that their committee 
significantly reduced the Commission’s freedom and even less that it has 
been set up to assure the Member States’ control" (Institut fur Europaische 
Politik, 1989, p.9). According to the same study, the Council acts only 
rarely on the complex technical matters dealt with by the comitology 
committees, but when it does, its decisions mostly support the 
Commission’s original proposals (ib., p.123).
In fact, the Council cannot compete with the expertise at the disposal 
of the Commission and its Directorates (Peters, 1992, p.119). The offices 
of the Commission responsible for a particular policy area form the central 
node of a vast "issue network" which includes, in addition to experts from 
the national administrations, independent experts, academics, consumer and 
other public-interest advocates, and representatives of economic interests, 
professional organizations and sub-national governments. Commission 
officials engage in extensive discussions with all these actors but remain 
free to choose whose ideas and proposals to adopt. The variety of policy 
positions, which is typically much greater than at the national level, 
increases the freedom of choice of European officials. It may even happen 
that national experts find the Commission a more receptive forum for new 
ideas than their own administration. A significant piece of safety 
regulation, the 1989 Machinery Directive (89/392/EEC) offers a striking 
example of this. The crucially important technical annex of the directive 





























































































the British approach to safety at the workplace. Having failed to persuade 
the policy makers of his own country, he brought his innovative ideas to 
Brussels, where they were welcomed by Commission officials and 
eventually become European law (Eichener, 1992, p.52).
Thus, despite all the limitations imposed by the member states, the 
Commission is often able to play the role of a policy entrepreneur. Policy 
entrepreneurs are constantly on the look out for windows of opportunity 
through which to push their preferred ideas. Policy windows open on those 
relatively infrequent occasions when three usually separate process streams 
— problems, politics, and policy ideas — come together. Policy 
entrepreneurs concerned about a particular problem search for solutions in 
the stream of policy ideas to couple to their problem, then try to take 
advantage of political receptivity at certain points in time to push the 
package of problem and solution (Kingdon, 1984). This is precisely what 
happened in the case of the Machinery Directive mentioned above 
(Eichener, 1992) and in several other instances (Dehousse and Majone, 
1994).
A successful policy entrepreneur possesses three basic qualities: first, 
he must be taken seriously either as an expert, as a leader of a powerful 
interest group, or as an authoritative decision maker; second, he must be 
known for his political connections or negotiating skills; third, and 
probably most important, successful entrepreneurs are persistent (Kingdon, 
1984, pp. 189-90). Because of the way they are recmited, the structure of 



























































































Commission officials often display the qualities of a successful policy 
entrepreneur to a degree unmatched by national civil servants.
In particular, the Commission exhibits the virtue of persistence to an 
extraordinary degree. Most important policy innovations in the EC have 
been achieved after many years during which the Commission persisted in 
its attempts to "soften up" the opposition of the member states, while 
waiting for a window of opportunity to open. A textbook example is the 
case of the Merger Control Regulation approved by the Council on 
December 21, 1989, after more than 20 years of political wrangling 
(Majone, 1995).
Another strategy used by policy entrepreneurs consists in introducing 
a new dimension to the policy debate. By changing the nature of the 
debate, an entrepreneur may be able to break up existing equilibria and 
create new and more profitable policy outcomes. The successful 
entrepreneur, according to Riker (1986, p.64) "probes until he finds some 
new alternative, some new dimension that strikes a spark in the preferences 
of others". An example of this strategy is the Commission’s advocacy of 
the concept of "working environment". This concept opens up the 
possibility of regulatory interventions in areas traditionally considered to 
be outside the field of health and safety at work, such as stress and fatigue. 
The above-mentioned Directive 89/392 and also Directive 90/270 on health 
and safety for work with display screen equipment, are inspired by this 
regulatory philosophy.
In view of the claim often made by students of EC policy making, 





























































































member states, it should be pointed out that these directives extend to the 
European level the approach of two small countries — Denmark and the 
Netherlands, which first introduced the concept of working environment 
into their legislation — and were opposed by Germany in order to preserve 
the power and traditional approach of its own regulatory bodies (Feldhoff, 
1992; Eichener, 1992).
It is no coincidence that the best examples of policy entrepreneurship 
at the EC level are in the field of social regulation. The reason becomes 
clear if one recalls James Q.Wilson’s well-known classification of the 
politics of different policy fields (Wilson, 1980, pp.366-372). The 
classification is structured according to the perceived' distribution of the 






































































































When both costs and benefits are widely distributed (e.g., social security, 
national health care, education) interest groups have little incentive to form 
around such issues since no identifiable segment of society can expect to 
capture a disproportionate share of the benefits or to avoid a 
disproportionate share of the costs. Hence, such issues are dealt with in the 
traditional arena of majoritarian politics. In the European context this 
means that the issues are dealt with at the national rather than at the 
supranational level. This explains why traditional social policy remains 
largely under the control of the member states.
When both costs and benefits are concentrated, each side has a strong 
incentive to organize and exercise political influence. EC structural policy 
is a pertinent example. Although the structural funds aid some industrially 
declining regions in the wealthier countries, the overall effect of the policy 
is to transfer resources from one well defined group of contributing 
countries to another, equally well defined group of receiving countries. As 
this example suggests, the European analogue of interest-group politics is 
intergovernmental bargaining between two (or more) groups of countries.
When the benefits of a prospective policy are concentrated while the 
costs are widely distributed, small, easily organized groups (such as 
oligopolistic firms in the automobile, electronics, chemical or 
pharmaceutical industries) have powerful incentives to lobby in order to 
obtain favourable legislation at the national or, increasingly, at the 
European level. On the other hand, consumers have little incentive to 
organize since the costs of the regulation are low on a per capita basis. The 




























































































suggests the possibility that the regulators become captured by the 
regulated interests.
Finally, a policy may confer general (though perhaps small) benefits 
at a cost to be borne chiefly by a small segment of society. Most social 
regulation falls into this category. The costs of cleaner air and water, safer 
products, and better working conditions are borne, at least initially, by 
particular segments of industry. Since the incentive to organize is strong for 
the opponents of the policy but weak for the beneficiaries, social regulatory 
measures can be passed only if there is a policy entrepreneur who can 
mobilize public sentiment (by capitalizing on crises like the Seveso or 
Tchemobyl disasters), put the opponents of the regulatory measures on the 
defensive, and associate the legislation with widely shared values — clean 
air and water, health and safety, equal rights for men and women.
According to Wilson, the policy entrepreneur "serves as the vicarious 
representative of groups not directly part of the legislative process" (ib., 
p.370). This observation helps to explain the growing significance of 
social regulation at the European level. At the national level, social 
regulation plays a politically less important role than macroeconomic or 
redistributive social policy. The most powerful political coalitions still 
form around issues of redistribution and macroeconomic management. The 
resulting policies tend to favour producers — managers, unionized workers, 
organized professionals — at the expense of consumers. Moreover, political 
systems characterized by party control of both executive and legislature, 
highly centralized public bureaucracies and weak judicial review do not 





























































































the emergence of independent policy entrepreneurs. In this respect, 
Germany is the (partial) exception which confirms the rule.
The situation is very different at the European level. Here the 
redistributive function of government is severely limited by the small size 
of the budget, and the macroeconomic function almost non-existent; 
redistributive coalitions and corporatist networks are correspondingly weak. 
Again, agriculture is the exception that confirms the rule (the case of 
regional aid is different: these transfers can perhaps be viewed as incentive- 
efficient mechanisms in the sense of Milgrom and Roberts (1992), that is, 
as a way of overcoming the resistance of some member states to 
efficiency-enhancing policies such as the completion of the internal 
market). In this situation, the insulation of the Commission from partisan 
politics and the electoral cycle, the activism of the Court of Justice, and the 
interest of the European Parliament in finding a distinctive role for itself, 
are all factors that explain why diffuse interest are often better represented 
at the European than at the national level, and why political 
entrepreneurship is an important feature of European policy making. Notice 
the apparent paradox: the same supranational institutions so often criticized 
for their alleged "democratic deficit" are at the same time the advocates of 
diffuse interests that do not find adequate expression in the national 
political systems.
6. Normative conclusions " ‘v
The preceding pages should have made clear that centralization of 



























































































necessarily the best way, of correcting policy externalities and reducing 
transaction costs. It has also been argued that the level of centralization can 
be explained in part by the mutual distrust of the member states and the 
justified suspicion that national governments may use regulation to promote 
their own interests rather than the aggregate welfare of the Union. 
However, to juxtapose the national and supranational levels as if they were 
the only possible solutions of the dilemma of regulatory federalism — the 
trade-off between local preferences and policy externalities — is not only 
to push simplification beyond the limit of heuristic usefulness, but also to 
overlook promising possibilities of institutional reform.
To begin with, it should be noticed that the optimal assignment of 
regulatory responsibilities among different levels of governments need not 
coincide with existing jurisdictional boundaries. There may be significant 
externalities and a need for joint action between some, but not all, regions 
within a country or group of countries. Hence the optimal solution may 
be found neither at the European nor at the national level, but at some 
intermediate level comprising a group of states (or regions within different 
states) facing the same problem; the scope of the externality would 
determine the membership of the group. Self-regulating organizations 
encompassing several states ("regional compacts", such as the Delaware 
River Basin Commission) have been used in the United States since the 
1960s and in some cases even earlier (Derthick, 1974). More recently, 
institutional arrangements encompassing American states and Canadian 






























































































By pooling their financial, technical and administrative resources 
these consortia of states or regions are in a better position to deal 
satisfactorily with their regulatory problems than either by acting alone or 
by relying exclusively on centralized regulation which cannot be closely 
tailored to their specific needs. The "regional compact" model combines 
flexibility with economies of scale in policy formation and implementation. 
Its adoption on this side of the Atlantic would have far-reaching 
consequences for the future of European regulation. Instead of the 
traditional dichotomy of centralized or national regulation, with its artificial 
separation of rule making from enforcement, we would have a small 
regulatory body at the European level. Among the tasks of this body would 
be providing technical and administrative assistance, facilitating the 
diffusion of ideas and policy innovations, and acting as "regulator of last 
resort" where regional regulators failed to achieve their objectives. At 
present, a few environmental directives allow member states to set 
regionally differentiated standards in zones designated by them in 
accordance with Community guidelines. The model suggested here goes 
well beyond these timid attempts to tailor regulation to the specific needs 
of different regions of Europe.
Second, the main potential advantage of centralizing regulation at the 
European level — the reduction of transaction costs due to the mutual 
distrust and self-interested behaviour of the member states — is seriously 
compromised by a system of governance which, with a few exceptions, 
leaves implementation in the hands of the member states. This artificial 



























































































know about the theory and the practice of policy making. Some of its 
negative consequences have been analyzed by Fritz Scharpf in a well- 
known paper very appropriately titled "The Joint-Decision Trap" (Scharpf, 
1988).
Policy analysts point out that implementation is not a separable stage 
of policy making but rather, to paraphrase von Clausewitz, the continuation 
of policy formulation by other means (Majone and Wildavsky, 1979). The 
logic of relational contracting points in the same direction. As mentioned 
in section 4, the starting point of the relational-contracting approach is the 
observation that it is impossible to concentrate all of the relevant 
bargaining action and discretionary choices at the ex ante contracting stage. 
As Williamson, quoting I.R.MacNeil, writes, the fiction of the discreetness 
of the ex ante and ex post stages must be abandoned as the relation among 
contractual partners takes on the characteristics of a "minisociety with a 
vast array of norms beyond those centered on the exchange and its 
immediate processes". By contrast with the traditional view of contract, 
according to which the reference point for effecting adaptations remains the 
original agreement, the reference point under a relational approach is the 
"entire relation as it has developed [through] time. This may or may not 
include an "original agreement"; and if it does, may or may not result in 
great deference being given it" (Williamson, 1985, pp.71-72).
What all this means for European policy making is that the present 
structure of divided governance should be replaced by a system where the 
need for joint action is examined much more critically than in the past; but 




























































































responsibility, as well as the requisite authority, for ensuring that joint 
decisions are effectively implemented. Member states are beginning to 
realize that non-compliance threatens the credibility of their collective 
decisions. The European Council meeting at Dublin in June 1990 first gave 
the issue of non-compliance a high political profile in its final declaration.
In October 1991 the Council of Environmental Ministers held an 
informal meeting on implementation, as a result of which the Commission 
was instructed to submit proposals concerning the further development of 
policy on compliance and enforcement. At the Maastricht summit the 
member states again stressed the need for Community legislation to be 
accurately transposed into national law and effectively applied, while the 
Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) contains new powers for the 
European Court of Justice under which it may fine member states which 
fail to comply with the judgments of the Court. The Intergovernmental 
Conference on institutional reform, scheduled to begin in 1996, ought to 
take this consensus on the crucial importance of compliance as a starting 
point to re-assess the logic of the entire process of policy making in the 
EC. Our analysis suggests that institutional reform should not be limited 
to the European level, but should squarely face the motivation question — 
how to abate mistrust, obtain credible commitments, and achieve a better 
alignment of interests — at all levels of government.
Now, the main source of mutual distrust and poor credibility is, 
arguably, the suspicion that national and subnational governments may use 
their legal and policy instruments to pursue short-term political advantages 




























































































saw, are more centralization and greater uniformity of norms than is 
necessary for market integration. Under the present institutional 
arrangements, however, a plea for more decentralization and greater 
normative flexibility is easily seen as an open invitation to grant further 
discretionary powers to the member states thereby placing market 
integration in jeopardy.
One way out of this dilemma is to grant more independence to 
national, subnational, and supranational regulators, so that their 
commitment to a set of objectives decided at the European level is not 
compromised by domestic political considerations or by ministerial 
interference. Independence changes the motivation of regulators whose 
reputation now depends more on their ability to achieve the objectives 
assigned to their agencies than on their political skills. With independence, 
a problem-solving style of policy making tends to replace the more 
traditional bargaining style. Also, it is not difficult to show that greater 
independence implies more, rather than less, public accountability (Majone, 
1994b).
By now, the independence of central banks enjoys widespread 
political support in most countries of Europe. Even the Treaty of 
Maastricht, although generally opposed to further delegation of policy 
making powers to the supranational level, assigns sweeping powers to the 
European Central Bank (ECB). The ECB can make regulations that are 
binding in their entirety and become European and member states’ law, 
without the involvement of the Council or of national parliaments. The 




























































































this objective in complete independence of the other European institutions 
and of the national governments. Moreover, since the governors of the 
central banks of the member states are members of the ECB Council, they 
too must be insulated from domestic political influences in the performance 
of their task; they can no longer be players in the old game of pumping up 
the economy just before an election (Nicoll, 1993).
The recent rise of independent regulatory agencies throughout Europe 
(Majone, 1994d) shows that the perceived advantages of independence — 
professionalism, accountability by results, freedom from party political 
influence, greater policy continuity — are not confined to central banks. 
While these advantages are acknowledged in theory, however, old habits 
of ministerial interference continue to persist in practice. Government 
departments still preserve important regulatory powers so that the 
operations of agencies often are dependent on prior decisions of the 
minister laying down the principles to be applied. But the credibility of 
regulators will continue to remain low as long as agency autonomy can be 
disregarded with impunity in the name of short-term political 
considerations.
It will probably take some time before politicians in Europe become 
convinced, like their colleagues in America, that it is in their long-term 
interest to respect the independence of regulatory agencies, just as they 
respect the independence of the courts. In the meantime, measures should > 
be taken to strengthen the position of national regulators, and here the 





























































































Credibility can be developed through team work. Although people 
may be weak on their own, they can build resolve by forming a group 
(Dixit and Nalebuff, 1991). The same is true of organizations. A regulatory 
agency which sees itself as part of an international network of institutions 
pursuing similar objectives and facing analogous problems, rather than as 
a new and often marginal addition to a huge national bureaucracy, is more 
motivated to resist political pressures. This is because the regulator has an 
incentive to maintain his or her reputation in the eyes of fellow regulators 
in other countries. A politically motivated decision would compromise 
his/her international credibility and make cooperation more difficult to 
achieve in the future.
The European Commission should take the lead in facilitating and 
coordinating the work of EU regulatory networks, and in ensuring that their 
activities are consistent with European objectives. The network model is 
perhaps easiest to visualize in the field of competition. An over-worked and 
under-staffed DG IV has already advocated a move toward a decentralized 
system of enforcement via proceedings before national courts. However, it 
has been rightly pointed out that it would make more sense to transfer 
responsibility for enforcement to the national competition authorities than 
to national courts and private litigants. These authorities perform a role 
which is analogous to that of DG IV, and they possess the kind of 
experience and expertise which courts _of ordinary jurisdiction often lack. 
Moreover, there already exist direct links between Commission inspectors 
and national competition authorities as regards any investigations carried 



























































































competition authority must be associated with inquiries and investigations, 
and its officials must be present if a search of premises is carried out 
(Harding, 1994, pp.7-9).
There is no reason why the network model could not be extended to 
other areas of economic and social regulation. In fact, at an informal 
meeting of the Council of Ministers in October 1991, it was agreed that 
member states should establish an informal network of national 
enforcement officers concerned with environmental law. The recent 
creation of a number of European agencies (mostly in the field of social 
regulation) may be seen as a further move in this direction. However, the 
logic of the model suggests that not only national regulators but also their 
counterparts in the Commission should be independent. Although European 
commissioners are not supposed to pursue national interests, usually they 
are politicians who, after leaving Brussels, will continue their careers at 
home. This makes national pressures often difficult to resist. In a number 
of well-publicized cases, such pressures have produced flawed or at least 
inconsistent decision. Again, competition policy, including the control of 
mergers and of anti-competitive state aid, provides the clearest examples. 
Several analysts have argued that European will never have a coherent 
competition policy without a cartel office independent both from the 
national governments and from the Commission. Commissioners would still 
be able to reverse an independent agency’s decisions, as the German 
government does in the case of some Bundeskartellamt’s rulings. But the 






























































































Trans-national regulatory networks, like the "regional compact" 
model discussed above, represent in my opinion promising ways of dealing 
with the dilemma of regulatory federalism. Naturally, they raise a number 
of practical and conceptual issues, the most important of which is 
democratic accountability. The accountability problem is too complex to 
be discussed here. I can only refer the interested reader to another 
publication (Majone, 1994b) where I argue that independence and 
accountability can be complementary and mutually reinforcing rather than 
antithetical values. What is required to reconcile independence and 
accountability are richer and more flexible forms of control than the 
traditional methods of political and administrative oversight.
Clear and limited statutory objectives, strict procedural requirements 
like those imposed on American regulators by the Administrative 
Procedures Act, judicial review, cost-benefit analysis and the "regulatory 
budget", professionalism and expertise, monitoring by interest groups, even 
inter-agency rivalry, can all be elements of a pervasive but flexible system 
of control. When the system works properly no one controls an 
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